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Market concentration and bank M&As: Evidence from 
the European sovereign debt crisis 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a sample of 312 bank M&As announced between 1998 and 2016 in the EU-27 
countries, this paper investigates the impact of market concentration and the European 
sovereign debt crisis on the way investors react to these corporate events. In Western 
European countries, we find results which contrast the conventional wisdom that acquiring 
banks lose around the merger announcement date. In fact, since 2009, acquiring banks 
shareholders gain approximately $34 million around the announcement, a $56 million 
improvement compared to the pre-crisis period. These documented shareholder gains are also 
accompanied by significant improvements in post-merger profitability. Markedly, we link 
this superior performance of the post-2008 acquirers with the degree of market concentration 
in the Western European region. Finally, results for the Eastern European countries indicate 
that the crisis did not have a significant impact on the quality of bank M&As in the region. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G14; G21; G34 
Keywords: European sovereign debt crisis; bank mergers and acquisitions; market 
concentration; event study 
  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
In the recent decades, the financial liberalization of the capital markets, deregulation, and 
the introduction of the common currency have produced a significant wave of bank mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) in Europe (DeYoung et al., 2009). Despite the general agreement 
behind the forces driving the consolidation trends in the EU banking industry, there is little 
conclusive evidence on the performance of these transactions. As a matter of fact, the 
literature that examines the stock market reaction for European bank M&As provides mixed 
findings. Early studies fail to identify substantial shareholder wealth gains for the acquiring 
firms (Tourani-Rad and Van Beek, 1999; Ismail and Davidson, 2005), while others find 
announcement abnormal returns that are marginally positive (Hagendorff et al., 2008), or 
even negative (Campa and Hernando, 2006). The explanation behind this phenomenon is also 
debatable, with some studies reporting geographical focus or product diversification as 
possible sources of value creation (Beitel et al., 2004; Lepetit et al., 2004; Asimakopoulos 
and Athanasoglou, 2013). However, there is not yet any convincing determinant of acquirer 
performance in European bank M&As. 
The economic environment under which banks operate is detrimental to their performance. 
According to Molyneux and Thornton (1992), banks operating in more concentrated, and thus 
less competitive environments, can earn higher profits. By testing this assumption in the 
context of M&As, Berger (1995) and Focarelli and Panetta (2003) find that consolidation 
leads to higher concentration, which in turn leads to higher profits for the acquiring banks. 
Based on these findings, Hankir et al. (2011) argue that banks which expand in an already-
concentrated environment may earn excess profits due to a lessening of competition, and as a 
result, they should realize positive announcement abnormal returns. Up to date, evidence 
along these lines in the European Union (EU) is rather elusive, due to the high degree of 
competition in the region (Goddard et al., 2013). In fact, Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009), report 
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negligible gains in EU bank M&As, as a result of the increased competition of the post-Euro 
period. 
The onset of the European sovereign debt crisis caused severe structural changes in the EU 
banking markets (Beck et al., 2010). Since 2009, many European banks suffered substantial 
deposit outflows and recorded significant losses from the rapid increase in non-performing 
loans and their exposures to sovereign debt (Betz et al., 2014; Chan-Lau et al., 2015). A 
direct result of this financial distressed environment is the 31% decrease in the number of 
EU-28 banks over the period 2008 to 2017.
1
 Inevitably, this substantial reduction in the 
number of banks should translate to a corresponding increase in the market concentration.  In 
that event, a change in the structure of the European banking markets may have a two-sided 
effect. On the one hand, from a policy perspective, an increase in market concentration may 
facilitate anticompetitive effects (Casu and Girardone, 2006). On the other hand, from a 
shareholder perspective (which is the main focus of this study), a more concentrated 
environment may provide fertile ground for value-creating bank M&As. 
The primary objective of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship between 
market structure and shareholder wealth gains in European bank M&As. We conjecture that 
the European sovereign debt crisis offers a live laboratory for the research question explored 
in this study, since it emerged as a shock to the structure of the European banking markets. If 
the crisis has indeed increased concentration in the EU region, then, it is likely that successful 
bidders may exert their dominant position in the market for the benefit of their shareholders. 
On this end, we expect to find higher abnormal returns around the announcement date for 
deals occurring after the onset of the crisis, and if so, we attempt to link these improvements 
to the degree of market concentration in the EU region. 
                                                          
1
 Source: European Banking Federation (https://www.ebf.eu/ebf-media-centre/banking-in-europe-ebf-publishes-
2018-facts-figures/). 
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To test our predictions, we initially analyze the evolution of market concentration in the 
EU-27 countries over the past decades.
2
 We find that since 2009, concentration was 
significantly increased in Western European economies, while the opposite is true for the 
Eastern European region. Given this adverse crisis effect on concentration, we analyze 
separately the two regions throughout our study. 
Our bank M&As sample consists of 312 deals announced between 1998 and 2016. Our 
results provide novel evidence that the financial crisis has created opportunities for merger 
gains in Western European deals. More precisely, since 2009, biddings bank realize a mean 
return of 1.86% over a three-day window centered on the announcement date, figure that is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Before the crisis, the average acquirer was subject to a 
loss of −1.18, which is also statistically significant at the 1% level. Markedly, the difference 
between the two periods is not only statically, but also economically significant, since it 
corresponds to a $56 million improvement in shareholder value. On the contrary, in Eastern 
European deals, acquirers experience insignificant abnormal returns both before and during 
the crisis. 
At the univariate level, it appears that the compelling improvement in acquirer abnormal 
returns in Western deals is accompanied by a significant increase in concentration ratios in 
this region. To investigate whether and to what extent the abnormal returns of Western 
European deals post-2008 can be attributed to changes in concentration, we utilize a two-
stage instrument variable approach as in Dahya et al. (2019). Our findings provide strong 
support to the notion that a higher degree of market concentration leads to higher acquirer 
abnormal returns in Western European bank M&As. Conversely, we do not report a similar 
relationship in the subset of Eastern European mergers. 
                                                          
2
 We do not include Croatia in our analysis, since it entered the EU in 2013. 
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If the documented shift in abnormal returns for Western European deals indeed relates to 
concentration benefits, then, acquiring banks should also realize excess profits following the 
mergers. For this reason, we examine the acquirers’ financial performance 1 or 2 years after 
the merger completion year. The results of this analysis indicate that in Western European 
deals, acquirer return on assets (ROA) is significantly higher during the crisis, compared to 
the pre-crisis years. In addition, these post-merger profitability improvements are explained 
to a large extent by the post-2008 increase in concentration of the Western European region. 
Further, to ensure that our results are not driven by any industry trends, we use a combination 
of propensity score matching approach with the difference-in-differences methodology. 
While before the crisis acquiring banks underperformed their similar non-acquiring 
institutions, this pattern has been reversed after 2008. In fact, during the crisis years, 
acquiring banks achieve significantly higher profits compared to their non-acquiring 
counterparts. 
To the best of our knowledge, empirical evidence on the impact of the European sovereign 
debt crisis on bank acquisitions is rather ambiguous. Beltratti and Paladino (2013) examine 
139 deals announced during the crisis, and find no evidence of shareholder wealth gains 
around the announcement of these deals. Rao-Nicholson and Salaber (2015) investigate the 
impact of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 on bank acquisitions around the globe. The 
authors suggest that the crisis has only benefited deals involving emerging-economy bidders 
and developed-economy targets. Both studies however focus on issues other than the 
structure of the banking markets, and limit their analysis to deals announced before 2010 and 
2012, respectively. 
Our contribution in the literature is twofold. First, by using a large examination period, 
which covers the different phases of the European Union, we are able to provide conclusive 
evidence regarding the performance of acquiring banks over the years. We observe that the 
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European sovereign debt crisis marks a turnaround in the quality of bank M&As, especially 
in the Western European region. Before the crisis, acquiring banks realize significantly 
negative abnormal returns around the announcement date. During the crisis however, banks 
that expand in Western European economies realize announcement abnormal returns of 
unprecedented magnitude. Most notably, these documented improvements in shareholder 
gains are accompanied by corresponding improvements in the long-run financial performance 
of the acquiring banks. Second, we link our findings to the changing structure of the 
European economies after the onset of the crisis. Our evidence provides strong support to the 
notion that a higher level of market concentration leads to higher acquirer gains. In this 
regard, our work enriches the knowledge on the relationship between market concentration 
and bank M&As, and adds to the ongoing literature which examines the effect of market 
structure on bank performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes the sample selection process and methodology. Sections 4 and 5 discuss 
our results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Related literature 
2.1. An overview of the bank M&A literature 
There is a plethora of studies examining the stock market reaction to bank M&As 
announcements. The early strand of the literature focuses mainly on U.S. bank M&As, and 
suggests that bidders realize negative, or at best, insignificant announcement period abnormal 
returns (DeLong 2001; DeLong and DeYoung 2007; Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013). Evidence on 
European bank M&As reports controversial results. For instance, Tourani-Rad and Van Beek 
(1999) show that bidders make no significant gains over the period 1989 to 1996, while 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) indicate that bidders realize small positive abnormal returns. 
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In order to explain the mixed findings for the European deals, several authors have 
examined the relation between abnormal returns and geographical and/or product 
diversification. Beitel et al. (2004), suggest that bidders of domestic targets realize positive 
merger gains, whereas bidders of foreign targets experience negative abnormal returns in the 
scale of −0.85%. Lepetit et al. (2004) confirm these findings and also argue that cross-
product diversification could be a source of value creation for European bank M&As. In 
addition, Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou (2013) find that bidding banks exploit benefits 
from geographical focus only when the target firm is publicly-traded, highlighting the 
importance of an organized exchange as a discipline mechanism in the stock markets. By 
contrast, Campa and Hernando (2006) do not report any significant differences in abnormal 
returns between domestic and cross-border deals. 
Other studies use different approaches in order to explain the merger-related gains in 
European bank M&As. Hagendorff et al. (2008) compare bidder CARs for U.S. and 
European bank mergers, and find value losses for the former firms and positive wealth gains 
for the later firms. The authors attribute the difference in market reaction between the two 
regions to the level of investor protection of the target firms’ country. Chronopoulos et al. 
(2013) also find that the EU bidders outperform their U.S. counterparts, and document a 
significantly positive relation between abnormal returns and post-merger changes in profit 
efficiency. Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) examine the impact of consolidation on 
acquiring banks’ distance to default. They use abnormal returns as an explanatory variable in 
their regressions, but they fail to identify any significant relationship between abnormal 
returns and merger-related changes in bidding banks’ default risk. 
Collectively, the aforementioned studies indicate that European bank bidders realize 
minimal or economic trivial abnormal returns. Yet, under certain circumstances such as 
geographical focus or product diversification, bank M&As could be value creating for 
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acquiring firms. It is worth-mentioning however, that these results are heavily-dependent on 
the examination period, given that the sign and magnitude of bidder CARs fluctuate over the 
years. 
2.2. Market concentration and bank M&As  
It is a widely held belief that market structure, and particularly market concentration, has a 
significant impact on bank performance (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992). According to the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, banks operating in highly-concentrated 
markets can earn supernormal profits by setting higher lending rates and lower deposit rates 
(Berger and Hannan, 1989). By testing this hypothesis, De Guevara et al. (2005) and Beck et 
al. (2006) find that higher banking concentration leads to lower competition which in turn 
leads to higher profits. 
Bank mergers and market concentration are two highly-interrelated issues. In fact, intense 
consolidation in the banking industry goes hand in hand with higher market concentration 
(De Guevara et al., 2005). Increasing concentration, resulting from bank consolidation, is 
associated with less competitive pricing by banks (Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002). In 
accordance, Berger (1995) and Focarelli and Panetta (2003) find that after mergers, banks 
realize significant increases in their profit margins by either increasing their loan rates or 
decreasing their deposit rates. In this regard, mergers which allow banks to operate in more 
concentrated environments should also create value for the acquiring firms’ shareholders, due 
to the lessening of competition. Hankir et al, (2011) predict positive shareholder wealth gains 
for banks which choose to expand in highly-concentrated markets. In contrast, mergers 
occurring in low-concentrated environments may have the opposite effect for the acquiring 
firms’ shareholders. Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) find that the increased competition in Europe 
-resulting from the introduction of the common currency- had a negative effect on bidder 
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gains in bank M&As. Therefore, both studies indicate that the degree of market concentration 
can be a determinant factor in explaining bank merger gains. 
Onether strand of the literature focuses on the relationship between market structure and 
bank acquisition behavior. Hernando et al. (2009) argue that banks in more concentrated 
markets constitute attractive targets for foreign institutions. In fact, the authors find that 
cross-border acquisition activity in the EU-25 region is positively associated with the degree 
of market concentration of the target firms’ country. In addition, Hagendorff et al. (2012) and 
Molyneux et al. (2014) find that European acquirers pay higher premiums for banks located 
in more concentrated markets, presumably in anticipation of higher merger gains in such 
transactions. 
2.3. European market structure and the impact of the crisis 
The structure of the European banking markets varies significantly across regions and time 
periods. For the Western European economies, the consensus view is that competition was 
intense in the 2000s (Goddard et al., 2013). There are two main explanations behind this 
phenomenon: (1) the substantial increase in cross-border bank M&As during the decade, and 
(2) the implementation of several structural reforms such as the deregulation of capital flows, 
the single banking license, and the introduction of the Euro (Weill, 2013). As a result, 
concentration ratios for Western European countries like Germany, Italy, and the UK were 
substantially low in the previous decade (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). By contrast, over the 
same period, Eastern European banking systems were highly-concentrated and dominated by 
state-owned banks (Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009). However, due to the convergence 
with the EU, Eastern European countries have undergone fundamental transformation (Fries 
and Taci, 2005). Since the late nineties, many insolvent state-owned banks were closed or 
privatized by foreign institutions (Mamatzakis et al., 2005). In fact, by the end of 2014, 
approximately 60% of Eastern European banks were foreign-owned (Wu et al., 2017). 
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The European sovereign debt crisis has revealed the fragilities of the financial services 
industry and reshaped the structure of the EU banking markets (Vives, 2011; Danisman and 
Demirel, 2019). The impact of the crisis was significantly more severe in the Western 
European region, where banks have realized substantial losses due to their exposures in 
sovereign debt (Chan-Lau et al., 2015). Apart from the high rate of bank failures, many of the 
surviving institutions were also facing solvency issues due to low-profitability and depleted 
levels of capital (Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012; Betz et al., 2014; Black et al., 2016). 
Inevitably, such a financially distressed environment will result in less competitive and more 
concentrated banking markets, where fewer banks will have the ability to acquire other 
institutions, and more banks will be in the vulnerable position to become targets. 
Financial crises may indeed have a negative effect on competition (Clerides et al., 2015). 
However, the crisis impact on bank competition was significantly more pronounced in 
advanced economies compared to emerging markets (Mirzaei and Moore, 2014). As 
Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) suggest, Eastern European banks were less affected by the 
recent crisis, since these institutions were less exposed to sovereign debt that their Western 
European counterparts. Consequently, it is less likely that Eastern European banking markets 
experienced similar structural changes with the advanced European economies. As a matter 
of fact, Mirzaei et al. (2013) report decreases in the concentration ratios of Eastern European 
countries in the late 2000s, as a result of the increased foreign presence. 
3. Data selection and methodology 
3.1. Sample selection 
We obtain our M&As sample from Thomson Reuters EIKON database. The selected deals 
consist of European bank M&As announced between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 
2016.
3
 Our initial sample is retrieved based on the following criteria: 
                                                          
3
 Our examination period begins from 1998, since the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse provides data on 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and the Concentration-5 Index from 1997 and beyond.  
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1. Both bidders and targets are classified as banks or credit institutions. 
2. Both bidders and targets are located in the EU-27. 
3. Bidding firms are classified as public, while targets may also be privately-held firms 
or subsidiaries. 
4. The bidding firm acquired an interest of 50% and above in the target, raising its 
interest from less than 50% to more than 50%. 
5. Bidders have available equity returns data on Datastream for both the estimation and 
the event periods, and available accounting data on Worldscope for the year-end prior 
to the merger announcement. 
6. Deals where the same bidder acquired more than one target on a given day are 
eliminated. 
These criteria yield an initial sample of 336 observations. We exclude 9 deals due to lack 
of available information on market concentration on the ECB database. We also eliminate 2 
duplicate listings from the sample. Duplicates are instances where the same acquisition is 
reported more than one in the database. Further, by verifying our merger data against news 
articles from several sources, we delete 11 deals, due to inconsistencies between the database 
and press coverage.
4
 Finally, we omit 2 deals due to the fact that bidder experience 
extraordinary returns around the announcement date.
5
 Hence, our final sample consists of 312 
European bank M&As. 
3.2. Sample characteristics 
Table 1 reports data on market concentration for the EU-27 countries from 1998 to 2016.
6
 
We base our analysis on two frequently-used measures of market concentration: (1) the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and (2) the Concentration-5 Index (CR5).7 We report 
mean values for each country’s level of concentration both before and during the crisis, as 
                                                          
4
 For example, Banca Antonveneta SpA was classified as listed in its late 1990s acquisitions, despite the fact 
that the bank became publicly-traded in 2002. 
5
 Eurobank Ergasias SA and Vestjysk Bank A/S realized 11-day abnormal returns in the order of −93% and 
72%, respectively. Their inclusion however does not alter our results. 
6
 Data on concentration is lagged by one year, due to the fact that in our regressions we use data at the year-end 
prior to each merger announcement. 
7
 The definition for both variables is included in the Appendix. 
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well as the difference between the two sub-periods.
8
 Further, we divide the EU-27 countries 
in 17 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom) and in 10 Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). 
According to HHI, in 12 out of the 17 of the Western European member states (Cyprus, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and UK), concentration is significantly increased after 2008, while in only 2 countries 
(Austria and Belgium) concentration was decreased over this period.
9
 On average, 
concentration is significantly increased during the crisis for the whole Western European 
region. On the contrary, in Eastern European countries, we observe a different pattern. In 
fact, 6 out of 10 Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovenia) experience a decrease in their concentration indices, while only 
Slovakia became more concentrated since 2009. As a matter of fact, the average 
concentration of the Eastern European member states is significantly decreased after the onset 
of the crisis. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Figure 1 depicts the aggregate annual number of deals segmented by whether the target 
bank was located in a Western on in an Eastern European country. Throughout the whole 
examination period, mergers occurring in Western European economies dominate the sample. 
In terms of number of deals, we observe a peak in 2001, which is followed by a substantial 
decrease in the next four years and a sharp increase in years 2006 and 2008, respectively. In 
2009, bank merger activity plummeted as a result of the crisis, however, after 2011, the level 
of banking consolidation follows an upward trend. 
                                                          
8
 In some Eastern European countries, the ECB reports data on HHI and CR5 after 1997. Therefore, the analysis 
is conducted with the available data. 
9
 We discuss results based on HHI, since both concentration measures tell the same story. 
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Insert Figure 1 here 
Table 2 shows the geographic dispersion of the merging firms by bidder and target firms’ 
country. Bidders from Italy, Germany, Spain, Denmark, and United Kingdom were the most 
active during the whole examination period. Interestingly, the vast majority of target firms 
originate from the same countries. When it comes to cross-region expansion, Italian, 
Austrian, Greek, and French banks expand in many Eastern European countries, while 
Swedish banks choose to expand in Baltic countries. This finding is indicative of the 
increased foreign bank participation in the Eastern European region (Cull and Martinez-Peria, 
2013). By contrast, Eastern European banks engage almost exclusively in acquisitions within 
their region, with only one exception of a Polish bank acquiring an Austrian institution. 
Insert Table 2 here 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 3 presents the mean values of bidder- and deal-specific characteristics of our 
sample. We partition the sample based on the target firms’ region (Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe). Both sub-samples are divided into deals announced before, and during the crisis. We 
define the crisis period as all these years from 2009 and after, since by the first quarter of this 
year, all European economies had entered into recession (Claessens et al., 2010).
10
 Lastly, for 
each sub-period (pre-crisis, crisis) we compute differences in characteristics between Western 
European and Eastern European deals. 
Panel A of Table 3 illustrates mean values of bidder-specific characteristics. Initially, we 
observe that there are significant differences between the two-periods in both Western and 
Eastern European deals. More precisely, bidding banks are significantly more capitalized 
since 2009, which is consistent with the more stringent regulatory environment and the 
increased minimum capital requirements of the crisis period. In addition, bidders are also 
                                                          
10
 Our results remained robust to several different specifications of the pre-crisis and crisis periods. We change 
the beginning year of the crisis period to 2007, 2008, or 2010. All those changes had no impact on our results. 
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significantly less liquid during the crisis, fact which also justified by the liquidity shortages of 
this period (Minoiu and Reyes, 2013). Furthermore, the significant increase in the loan loss 
provisions is also a consequence of the economic downturn of the previous years 
(Mourouzidou-Damtsa et al., 2019). 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the deal-specific characteristics. Consistent with what reported 
in Table 1, market concentration in Western European deals is significantly increased, while 
the opposite is true for Eastern European deals. Interestingly, by looking at the differences in 
the two last columns, we may assume that after 2008, market concentration of the Eastern 
economies converges to that in Western economies (Mirzaei et al., 2013). It is also worth 
mentioning that Western bidders prefer to expand within their region during the crisis, fact 
that is consistent with the significant increase in the percentage of domestic deals over the 
same period. 
Insert Table 3 here 
3.4. Abnormal returns estimation 
In order to examine the stock market reaction for the proposed mergers of our sample, we 
employ the standard event study methodology, outlined in Brown and Warner (1985). Hence, 
we calculate daily abnormal returns using market model estimates, using Eq. (1): 
 , , ,ˆˆi t i t i i m tAR R a R        (1) 
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for the firm i on day t, Ri,t is the daily market return for 
stock i, Rm,t  is the daily return on the STOXX Europe 600 banks index and t = (−200, −21) 
indexes trading days prior to the merger announcement.
11
 Finally, ˆˆ ,i i  are the OLS 
estimates of the intercept and market beta coefficient, respectively. 
                                                          
11
 To ensure the robustness of our results against several model specifications, we have also employed the 
market adjusted return model, the mean adjusted returns model, and the market model with the Scholes-
Williams beta estimation. In addition, we used other estimation periods (−300, −51) and (−120, −31). Results 
remained unchanged in all cases. 
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For a group of banks N, average abnormal returns are derived using Eq. (2): 
,1
1
i t
N
t j
A AR
N
R

       (2) 
Further, we calculate Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for each group of banks over 
an event window (t1, t2) using Eq. (3): 
2
1 2 1
[ , ] t
t
t t t t
CAR AR

      (3) 
Consequently, we estimate bidder CARs at the merger announcement date, as well as for 
3-, 5-, and 11-days event windows, centered on the announcement date (−1, +1), (−2, +2), 
(−5, +5). 
To gauge the statistical significance of abnormal returns, we first use a parametric test: the 
standardized cross-sectional test of Boehmer et al. (1991). This test is frequently-used in 
relevant studies, and adjusts for any potential increases in the variance of abnormal returns 
(Hagendorff et al., 2008; Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013). 
One issue with abnormal returns is that they tent to exhibit fat tails and they are usually 
right skewed. Parametric tests are not well-specified when the assumption of normality is 
violated. In fact, these tests reject too often when testing for positive abnormal returns, and 
too seldom when testing for negative abnormal returns. To account for this possibility, we 
also use the non- parametric test of Corrado (1989). This test has the advantage that is does 
not take into account the distribution of the abnormal returns and it makes inferences less 
sensitive to outliers. 
4. Main empirical results 
4.1. Market reaction at the announcement date 
Table 4 presents bidder CARs for all 312 bidders of our sample over four different event 
windows. Further, we partition the sample based on whether the target bank is located in 
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Western or Eastern European country, and we also test whether abnormal returns differ 
significantly between the pre-crisis, and the crisis period, respectively. 
Panel A of Table 4 reports results for all EU-27 deals. Results for the whole period 
indicate that bidding banks realize zero abnormal returns in all event windows surrounding 
the announcement. However, by segmenting the sample based on the two sub-periods, we are 
able to extract more conclusive results. In fact, bidders in the pre-crisis period experience 
negative and statistically significant abnormal returns in all event windows according to both 
the parametric and the non-parametric tests. In line with previous studies, market participants 
are skeptical about acquirers gaining at the announcement of a bank merger (Campa and 
Hernando, 2006; Ekkayokkaya et al., 2009). In contrast, the results for the crisis period 
provide a completely different picture. For example, on the announcement day, mean 
abnormal returns are in the order of 1.00% and statistically significant at the 5%, using both 
tests. Moreover, CARs for the 3-, 5-, and 11- day event windows are 1.54%, 1.27%, and 
1.65%, respectively, and statistically significant using both the standardized cross-sectional 
test and the rank test. More importantly, mean differences between the two periods range 
from 1.66% to 2.81%, and are statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases. 
Panels B and C of Table 4 report results for the subsamples of Western European and 
Eastern European deals, respectively. Notably, by breaking down our sample based on the 
region that banks choose to expand to, we obtain compelling results. In Western European 
deals, bidders realize significantly negative abnormal returns before the crisis, and 
significantly positive during the crisis. The magnitude of the reported losses and gains is 
substantially higher compared to what found for the whole sample. For instance, according to 
the three-day window, bidder abnormal returns before the crisis are in the order of −1.19%, 
while during the crisis bidder realize a mean CAR of 1.86%. Apparently, results of such 
magnitude are not only statistically significant but also economically. In dollar terms, pre-
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crisis Western deals destroy $21.72 million in shareholder value for the average bidding bank 
while a mean CAR of 1.86% translates to a shareholder value increase of $34.20 million for 
the average bidder. Consequently, mean differences between the two periods range from 
1.88% to 3.37%, and are statistically significant at the 1% level in all event windows. Results 
for Eastern European deals do not exhibit any significant variation across the two periods. In 
fact, bidder abnormal returns are in all cases indistinguishable from zero. Bidder CARs are 
higher since 2009, however, none of these differences are statistically significant at any 
conventional levels. 
Insert Table 4 here 
So far, the staggering part of the univariate analysis is the sign and magnitude of the 
bidder CARs in Western European deals during the crisis. It is worth mentioning that bidder 
abnormal returns of about 2% are not frequently observed in bank M&A studies. To get a 
better insight on this different market response, we illustrate in Figure 2 the cumulative 
abnormal returns over a forty-one days window for either Western or Eastern European deals. 
The dotted line represents bidder CARs for deals announced before the crisis, and the solid 
line represent bidder CARs for deals announced during the crisis. As shown in the figure, in 
Western European deals, bidders in the crisis period substantially outperform their pre-crisis 
peers in all days after the merger announcement. On the contrary, in Eastern European deals, 
both pre-crisis and crisis bidders realize virtually the same abnormal returns after the 
announcement day. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
These findings confirm that the European sovereign debt crisis has indeed changed the 
market perception for bank M&As in the Western European economies. For this reason, in 
the next parts of our analysis, we emphasize on the potential causes behind this phenomenon, 
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and particularly, on the role of market concentration in explaining this observed pattern in 
abnormal returns.  
4.2. OLS regressions for the whole sample 
The results of the univariate level provide preliminary evidence that bidder abnormal 
returns are significantly higher since 2009, especially in acquisitions of Western European 
banks. At this stage however, it is likely that this shift in investors’ behavior is explained by 
any other traditional determinants of abnormal returns, such as bidder size, method of 
payment, or the listing status of the target firm. To account for this possibility, we run several 
cross-sectional regression models, where we include a vector of frequently-used controls, as 
well as a dummy variable to capture the effect of crisis on bidder abnormal returns. We also 
use the two measures of market concentration (HHI, CR5) as controls in separate regressions, 
to examine whether market structure influences abnormal returns in any direction. For 
robustness, we use CARs of all different event period specification as the dependent variable 
in our regressions. Finally, we include bidder country fixed effects in all model 
specifications. 
Table 5 present the regression results for the whole sample of 312 M&As. The coefficient 
of the Crisis dummy is positive and statistically significant in all models. This finding 
indicates that deals carried out since 2009 are subject to higher bidder abnormal returns and 
this superior performance remains even after controlling for other potential influential factors. 
By contrast, results for market concentration are inconclusive. In model 1, the coefficient of 
HHI is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, in the remaining 
models (3, 5, and 7), the coefficient of HHI is still positive, but loses any statistical 
significance. Similarly, CR5 bears a statistically significant coefficient in models 2, and 4, 
and an insignificant coefficient in models 6, and 8. Despite its statistical significance 
however, the economic significance of this estimate is rather negligible. 
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A few of our control variables enter the regressions with statically significant coefficients. 
First, bidding firm’s size is negatively correlated with announcement period gains (models 1 
and 2). This finding indicates that small banks gain more from M&As, since large institutions 
should have achieved economies of scale and scope prior to the acquisition (Moeller et al., 
2004). Second, equity capital appears to have a positive effect on announcement return 
(models 5 and 6).  As DeLong and DeYoung (2007) suggest, higher levels of capital relate to 
better post-merger performance. Finally, adjusted R
2 
ranges from 2.4% to 12%, finding that is 
typically observed in cross-sectional regressions of bidder CARs (DeLong, 2003). 
Insert Table 5 here 
4.3. Two-stage regressions for Western and Eastern European deals 
The empirical evidence we have presented so far indicates that the crisis had indeed a 
positive effect on bidder abnormal returns. However, the evidence on the relation between 
abnormal returns and market concentration is rather weak. We present two possible 
explanations for this shortcoming. First, the impact of the crisis on market concentration 
differs significantly between acquisitions of Western and Eastern European banks. To 
account for this difference, we choose to examine the impact of concentration on abnormal 
returns in separate regressions. Second, the significant crisis effect on market concentration 
may contain an endogenous component. For instance, bidders that acquire Western European 
banks after the crisis will almost certainly operate in more concentrated markets, compared to 
the pre-crisis years. Therefore, to isolate the exogenous component of market concentration, 
we employ a two-stage regression approach using the crisis indicator as the instrumental 
variable, as in Alexandridis et al. (2017).  
A valid instrument should satisfy two conditions: the relevance and the exclusion 
conditions. The significant increase (decrease) of concentration in Western (Eastern) 
European economies during the crisis suggests that our crisis indicator should satisfy the 
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relevance condition. The exclusion condition implies that the only impact that the instrument 
(crisis) has on the outcome variable (abnormal returns) is though its affect on the endogenous 
variable (concentration). Although this condition is untestable, we believe that CARs are less 
likely to be directly affected by the crisis, and more likely to be indirectly affected by the 
crisis through its impact on market concentration. 
Table 6 presents the results of the two-stage OLS regressions for either Western or Eastern 
European deals. The dependent variable on the first-stage regressions is either HHI or CR5. 
In the second-stage regressions, the dependent variable is the three-day bidder CARs, and 
measures of concentration are based on their expected values from stage one.
12
 In Western 
deals, the Crisis dummy bears a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level in both first-stage regressions. This finding indicates that our crisis indicator is indeed a 
valid instrument of market concentration in Western European economies. Moving to our 
second-stage regressions, we observe that both concentration measures are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, such results largely confirm our prediction 
that higher levels of market concentration are associated with higher bidder abnormal returns.  
Conversely, in Eastern European deals we do not report a similar relationship. In the first-
stage regressions, our crisis indicator is negative and significant, however, in the second-
stage regressions, both measures of concentration are insignificant. 
Inferences from the two-stage regressions are sensitive to the weak instrument problem. 
To examine whether our crisis indicator is a weak instrument, we estimate two different first-
stage F-statistics: the Craig-Donald F-statistic, and (2) the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. The 
former is the most frequently-used in the literature, and the latter is more appropriate in our 
case, since we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. According to Stock and Yogo 
(2005), we may reject the weak instrument hypothesis if the first-stage F-statistics are higher 
                                                          
12
 For robustness we repeat the procedure using the alternative event window specifications as the dependent 
variable. Our results remain similar. 
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than 8.96. We observe that in the Western European subsample, both statistics substantially 
exceed this critical value, suggesting that Crisis is a relevant instrument in our two-stage 
regressions. In the Eastern European deals, we fail to reject the weak instrument hypothesis, 
fact that might justify the insignificant results for this subsample. 
Insert Table 6 here 
There are of course other potential influential factors that may drive our results. For 
instance, in a crisis period, financially healthy banks may exploit their position and acquire 
other institutions at fire-sale prices (Acharya et al., 2011). In this case, the higher abnormal 
returns of the post-2009 period may be explained by a significant decrease in acquisition 
premiums. To test this prediction, we obtain data on acquisition premiums from the Thomson 
Reuters EIKON database. We are able to find such data for 51 deals. This figure is well-
justified considering that from our original sample of 312 M&As, only 74 deals involve 
publicly-traded targets. By comparing premiums across the two sub-periods, we find that 
banks do not pay less in acquisitions during the crisis. 
5. Long-term performance 
5.1. Changes in merger related profitability 
In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis, we document a compelling 
improvement in bidder abnormal returns for acquisitions of Western European banks. In 
theory, announcement period returns should provide an unbiased estimate of the merger-
related performance improvements on the acquiring firm’s stockholders wealth (Moeller et 
al., 2004). In practise therefore, we should expect the documented improvement in 
announcement period returns to be accompanied by significant improvements in post-merger 
performance.  
In this section, we examine the merger-related changes in profitability (ΔROA), for our 
whole sample of 312 European bank M&As. ΔROA is defined as the difference between the 
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post-merger ROA and the pre-merger ROA. Post-merger refers to 1, or 2 years after the 
merger completion year, and pre-merger year refers to the last calendar year prior to the 
merger completion year.
13
 Consistent with our analysis so far, we partition the sample based 
on whether the deal involves a Western European or an Eastern European bank, and whether 
the deal was announced before or during the crisis. 
In Table 7, we report changes in profitability around the merger completion. Markedly, 
our results complement the abnormal returns analysis. More precisely, in the subsample of 
Western European deals, acquirers realize decreases in post-merger profitability when the 
deal is announced before the crisis. However, after 2008, acquirers realize significant 
improvements in profitability in the second post-merger year. The difference between the two 
periods indicates that during the crisis, acquiring banks realize significantly higher 
profitability improvements compared to the pre-crisis years. In contrast, the results for the 
Eastern European deals suggest that the crisis does not have an impact on ΔROA. 
Insert Table 7 here 
5.2. Profitability and market concentration 
There is a wide range of literature supporting the significant impact of market structure on 
banks’ profitability (Bourke, 1989; Berger, 1995; Hankir et al., 2011). Hence, we test this 
relationship by utilizing two stage-regressions in a similar fashion with the abnormal returns 
analysis. Following the same line of reasoning, we assume that our crisis indicator should be 
a relevant instrument in our two-stage regressions. Finally, we conduct separate analyses for 
Western versus Eastern European deals, because the crisis had an adverse affect on the 
market structure of the two regions. 
Table 8 presents the results of the two-stage regressions. In the first stage regressions, the 
dependent variable is either HHI or CR5, while in the second stage regressions the dependent 
                                                          
13
 For the second post-merger year, we lose some observations due to unavailability of data on Worldscope. For 
example, 4 banks completed their acquisitions in 2017, and therefore, we do not have data for 2019. 
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variable is the ΔROA. The results of the first-stage regressions are similar to what reported in 
Table 6, so we focus in analyzing the results of the two-stage regressions. Initially, in 
Western European deals, we observe that both measures of concentration bear positive and 
statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level. This evidence is supportive of the SCP 
hypothesis, which predicts higher profits for banks operating in more concentrated 
environments (Tan, 2016; Parrado-Martinez et al., 2019). Furthermore, the results of the first-
stage F-statistics indicate that our crisis indicator is a strong instrument in our two-stage 
regressions. On the contrary, results for the Eastern European deals suggest that market 
concentration has a negative impact on acquiring banks’ profitability. This result is consistent 
with Mirzaei et al. (2013), who find that de-concentration improves profitability in emerging 
economies. However, our instrumental variable should be considered weak due to low levels 
of the first-stage F-statistics. Therefore, the evidence on the relationship between market 
concentration and profitability for this subsample should be interpreted with caution. 
Insert Table 8 here 
Collectively, our results for the Western European deals indicate that abnormal returns and 
profitability changes seem to follow a parallel trend. In fact, after 2008, abnormal returns and 
profitability changes are significantly higher compared to the previous years. In addition, we 
find that both measures are positively correlated with the level of market concentration. 
Motivated by these results, we examine the relationship between abnormal returns and 
profitability changes as in DeLong and DeYoung (2007). In unreported regressions, we find 
that more profitable mergers experience significantly higher announcement abnormal returns. 
By contrast, we do not find any similar relationship in the subsample of Eastern European 
deals. 
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5.3. Profitability of acquiring versus non-acquiring banks 
Most studies that examine the long-run financial performance of acquiring banks take into 
account the industry trends (Cornett et al., 2006; Campa and Hernando, 2006). Industry-
adjusted performance is usually defined as the difference between the acquiring firms’ 
performance and the mean performance of all non-acquiring firms. Although this approach 
indeed accounts for industry trends, it may be subject to selection bias issues. For example, if 
larger and more profitable banks become acquirers, then the standard industry-adjusted 
approach may yield biased results (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011). To address this selection 
bias problem, we combine propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-differences 
(DiD) techniques, as in Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and Leledakis and Pyrgiotakis (2019). 
The main purpose of this analysis is to compare the performance of acquiring banks with 
the performance of comparable non-acquiring banks.
14
 To identify the comparable non-
merging banks, we utilize the PSM approach. To employ this approach, we run several probit 
models, where the probability of a bank being an acquirer is a function of firm-specific 
observable characteristics. We then assign each bank with a probability of being an acquirer 
(propensity score), and we match each acquiring bank with a non-acquiring bank that is the 
closest match in terms of propensity score.
15
 In this setting, acquiring banks constitute the 
treated group, while non-acquiring banks belong to the control group. 
Before turning into the results of the PSM analysis, we must ensure that the groups being 
compared are adequately balanced. In other words, this balancing hypothesis suggests that the 
mean of each observable characteristic has to be the same for acquiring and non-acquiring 
banks. This guarantees that the assignment to the treatment is random, and as such, any 
difference in the variable of interest between the two groups can be more safely attributed to 
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 Non-acquiring banks of year t are those banks that did not acquired onether institution from year t−1 to year 
t+1. 
15
 We match using the nearest neighbor matching approach (one-to-one). Matching is done with replacement. 
For robustness, we also used more than one nearest neighbors and we did not allow for replacement. We obtain 
similar results. 
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the treatment, as opposed to some alternative force. In untabulated analysis, we find that 
mean values of observable characteristics between treated and control groups are 
indistinguishable from zero, fact that satisfies the balancing hypothesis. 
Selection bias may also occur from differences in unobservable characteristics between 
comparison groups. Recall that our variable of interest (ΔROA) is in differenced form. This 
means that the difference in ΔROA between treated and control groups is in fact a  
DiD estimate. By examining changes in profitability instead of levels, we are able to account 
for unobservable differences between comparison groups (Almeida et al., 2012). Therefore, 
the combination of PSM and DiD techniques allows us to mitigate selection bias issues 
associated with both observable and unobservable differences between acquiring and non-
acquiring banks. 
Table 9 present the results of our analysis for Western European countries.
16
 To replicate 
the results of Table 7, we run separate probit models for the pre-crisis and the crisis periods, 
respectively. Panel A of Table 9 reports the results of our probit models. In each model, we 
use year fixed effects to account for time trends.
17
 The significant coefficients of the firm-
specific variables in all our models suggest that there are innate differences between 
acquiring and non-acquiring banks, fact that supports our concerns for the existence of 
selection bias. For instance, after 2008, acquiring banks were larger and more liquid 
compared to the non-acquiring banks. Moving to the DiD estimators presented in Panel B, we 
observe that before the crisis, acquiring banks underperform non-acquiring banks in terms of 
profitability, while during the crisis, acquiring banks are significantly more profitable 
                                                          
16
 In this analysis, we use Western European acquirers that expand in their region and Western European non-
acquirers. Thus, we omit the one deal which involved an Eastern European acquirer and a Western European 
target from the analysis. We also conduct a comparable analysis for the Eastern European region, and we find 
insignificant results.  
17
 The use of country fixed effects could also be helpful. However, their inclusion worsens the quality of 
matching between treated and control groups. We account for geographic dispersion by distinguishing between 
core and periphery Western European countries as in De Santis (2014). 
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compared to their PSM-matched non-acquiring counterparts. Markedly, these results confirm 
that the findings of Table 7 are not sensitive to industry trends. 
Insert Table 9 here 
One possible concern with our PSM approach is the “timing” of the matches. It is likely 
that our parametric approach matches acquiring and non-acquiring banks with the closest 
propensity score, but not in the same year. The use of year fixed effects in our probit models 
helps accounting for this problem, however, it does not ensure exact matching. Therefore, for 
robustness, we also employ a non-parametric matching estimator outlined by Abadie and 
Imbens (2006). This approach produces exact matches on categorical variables. Hence, we 
require exact matches on the acquiring banks’ pre-merger year, and we proceed with the 
estimator using the remaining controls of Table 9.
18
 Notably, non-parametric matching 
produces similar results with the PSM approach. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between market structure and firm 
performance in bank M&As.  Initially, we treat the European sovereign debt crisis as a shock 
to the market structure of the European banking markets, while we assume a different crisis 
effect on Western versus Eastern European economies. In fact, we find that after 2008, 
market concentration has significantly increased in Western European countries, whereas the 
opposite is true for the countries in the Eastern European region. We then examine acquiring 
banks’ performance both in terms of announcement abnormal returns and long-term 
profitability, and we attempt to link any improvements to the documented changes in market 
concentration measures. 
Our main empirical results support the emerging view that the crisis has changed the 
landscape of the market for corporate control. In Western European deals, we mark a 
                                                          
18
 For example, if a treated bank acquired onether bank in 2011, then its pre-merger year is 2010. Thus, we 
restrict that our match will be a non-acquiring bank of the year 2010.  
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significant improvement in abnormal returns around the announcement date since the onset of 
the crisis. In fact, after 2008, bidding banks experience approximately 3% higher three-day 
announcement abnormal returns compared to the previous years. Markedly, the higher 
abnormal returns coincide with significant improvements in profitability, fact that indicates a 
casual relationship between long-term performance and short-term stock returns. More 
importantly, we show that both announcement abnormal returns and profitability 
improvements are strongly related to the degree of market concentration in the target firms’ 
banking markets. Therefore, considering the more concentrated environment of the post-2008 
period, we could argue that the European sovereign debt crisis should provide fertile ground 
for value-creating bank M&As in the Western European region. Finally, we do not find such 
effects for the Eastern European subsample, since both abnormal returns and profitability 
appear to be unaffected from the crisis. 
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Appendix  
Variable definitions 
Panel A: Bidder characteristics 
Variables Definition 
Ln(Size) The natural logarithm of the bidding firm’s total assets at year-end prior to 
the merger announcement. 
Equity-to-assets The ratio of the bidding firm’s common equity to total assets at year-end 
prior to the merger announcement. 
ROA Bidding firms' return on asset (ROA) at year-end prior to the merger 
announcement. 
Liquidity The ratio of the bidding firm’s loans to deposits at year-end prior to the 
merger announcement. 
Provisions The ratio of the bidding firm’s provisions for loan losses to total loans at 
year-end prior to the merger announcement. 
Panel B: Deal characteristics 
Variables Definition 
Crisis Dummy variable: 1 when the deal is announced after 2009, and 0 
otherwise. 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: equals to the sum of squares of the market 
shares of all banks in a country. 
CR5 Concentration-5 Index: equals to the percentage of bank assets held by the 
5 largest banks in a country. 
Days to completion The difference (in calendar days) between the completion date and the 
announcement date. 
Domestic Dummy variable: 1 if both bidder and target are headquartered in the same 
European country, and 0 otherwise. 
Public 
 
Dummy variable: 1 for acquisitions of publicly-traded targets, and 0 
otherwise. 
Private 
 
Dummy variable: 1 for acquisitions of privately-held targets, and 0 
otherwise. 
Subsidiary Dummy variable: 1 for acquisitions of subsidiary targets, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Cash Dummy variable: 1 when the deal is financed purely with cash, and 0 
otherwise. 
Stock Dummy variable: 1 when the deal is financed purely with stock, and 0 
otherwise. 
Combo Dummy variable: 1 when the deal is financed with a combination of cash 
and stock, and 0 otherwise. 
Western bidder Dummy variable: 1 if the bidding bank is located in one of the 17 Western 
European countries. 
Periphery  Dummy variable: 1 if the bidding bank is located in one of the EU 
periphery countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain). 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of M&As by year 
The figure illustrates the annual number of deals of completed EU bank mergers announced between 1998 and 
2016. Both bidders and targets are located in EU-27. The sample consists of 312 mergers between public 
bidders and public, private, or subsidiary targets. Both bidders and targets are commercial banks or credit 
institutions. Western Europe represents mergers where the target is a Western European bank. Eastern Europe 
represents mergers where the target is an Eastern European bank. Pre-crisis period is from 1998 to 2008 and 
crisis period is from 2009 to 2016.  Merger data are collected from Thomson Reuters EIKON database. 
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Figure 2 
Bidder announcement CARs over a (−20, +20) window 
The figure depicts comparative CARs between −20 and +20 days around the merger announcement date for bidders in the pre-crisis, and crisis periods, respectively. Western 
Europe represents mergers where the target is a Western European bank. Eastern Europe represents mergers where the target is an Eastern European bank. Pre-crisis period is 
from 1998 to 2008 and crisis period is from 2009 to 2016. The dotted line represents bidder CARs for deals announced in the pre-crisis period. The solid line represents 
bidder CARs for deals announced in the crisis period. 
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Table 1 
Market concentration in the EU-27 
The table reports market concentration in the banking industry for the 27 European member states over the 
period 1998 to 2016. Pre-crisis period is from 1998 to 2008 and crisis period is from 2009 to 2016. Data on 
concentration is lagged by one year, since we use data at year-end prior to the merger announcement. HHI 
represents the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which is computed as the sum of the squared market shares of each 
country’s’ banks. CR5 represents the concentration (5) which is computed as the percentage assets of each 
country’s total banking assets held by the 5 largest domestic institutions. Significance for differences in means is 
based on the two-tail t-test assuming unequal variances. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
   HHI    CR5  
Panel A: Western Europe  Pre-crisis Crisis Difference  Pre-crisis Crisis Difference 
Austria  0.054 0.040 −0.014***  43.193 36.757 −6.436*** 
Belgium  0.170 0.120 −0.050***  77.485 69.190 −8.295** 
Cyprus  0.101 0.125 0.024**  61.205 63.874 2.669** 
Denmark  0.119 0.114 −0.005  66.912 66.367 −0.545 
Finland  0.276 0.352 0.076***  86.881 87.765 0.884 
France  0.060 0.059 −0.001  47.028 47.016 −0.012 
Germany  0.016 0.028 0.012***  20.624 31.063 10.439*** 
Greece  0.109 0.168 0.059**  65.542 82.091 16.549** 
Ireland  0.057 0.067 0.010***  44.990 48.130 3.140** 
Italy  0.024 0.040 0.016***  27.652 38.791 11.139*** 
Luxemburg  0.030 0.034 0.004*  29.544 31.664 2.120 
Malta  0.157 0.138 −0.019  77.568 75.680 −1.888 
Netherlands  0.180 0.207 0.027***  83.374 84.049 0.675 
Portugal  0.094 0.119 0.025***  59.739 70.503 10.764*** 
Spain  0.046 0.068 0.022***  40.792 51.429 10.637*** 
Sweden  0.083 0.087 0.004*  56.841 58.328 1.487* 
United Kingdom  0.033 0.049 0.016***  31.930 41.314 9.384*** 
Average  0.094 0.107 0.013***  54.017 57.883 3.867*** 
   HHI    CR5  
Panel B: Eastern Europe  Pre crisis Crisis Difference  Pre crisis Crisis Difference 
Bulgaria  0.076 0.080 0.004  53.501 54.133 0.632 
Czech Republic  0.111 0.101 −0.010***  65.354 61.992 −3.362*** 
Estonia  0.382 0.264 −0.118***  98.046 90.587 −7.459*** 
Hungary  0.084 0.083 −0.001  53.318 52.721 −0.597 
Latvia  0.107 0.103 −0.004  63.629 65.658 0.029 
Lithuania  0.203 0.179 −0.024**  84.171 83.905 0.266 
Poland  0.069 0.060 −0.009**  49.081 45.366 −3.715** 
Romania  0.110 0.085 −0.025***  57.417 54.343 −3.074** 
Slovakia  0.115 0.124 0.009***  65.522 71.482 5.960*** 
Slovenia  0.134 0.112 −0.022***  64.293 58.351 −5.942*** 
Average  0.145 0.119 −0.026***  67.077 63.654 −3.423*** 
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Table 2 
Distribution of merging firm by bidders’ and targets’ country 
The table shows the geographic distribution of completed European bank M&As announced between 1998 and 2016. Both bidders and targets are located in EU-27. The 
sample consists of 312 mergers between public bidders and public, private, or subsidiary targets. Bidders and targets are commercial banks or credit institutions. Merger data 
are collected from Thomson Reuters EIKON database. The definition of the abbreviations is as follows: Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CP), Czech 
Republic (CZ), Denmark (DE), Finland, (FN), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HN), Ireland (IR), Italy (IT), Latvia (LA), Lithuania (LT), Luxemburg 
(LU), Netherlands (NE), Poland (PO), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SV), Spain (SP), Sweden (SW), and United Kingdom (UK).  
 Target   
 Western Europe    Eastern Europe   
Bidder  AU BE CP DE FN FR GE GR IR IT LU NE PT SP SW UK  BG CZ HN LA LT PO RO SK SV  Total 
Western Europe                            
Austria 5                  3 1   1 1 1   12 
Belgium  2    1 1     1    2            7 
Cyprus        1                    1 
Denmark    22 1                       23 
Finland     3          1             4 
France    1  3 1   3 1  1   1   1  1  2   1  16 
Germany 1 1  1  1 19  1  2 1  4         1     32 
Greece   1     13          2      1    17 
Ireland         2                   2 
Italy      1 1   79 1     1   2    2  3 1  91 
Luxembourg      1 1   1  1                4 
Netherlands       2   2  1                5 
Portugal        1     3               4 
Spain       1      3 22  3       1     30 
Sweden    6 1  1        3      1 2      14 
United Kingdom    1     1 1 1   16            20 
Eastern Europe                          
Bulgaria                  2          2 
Czech Republic                  2         2 
Hungary                        1 1   2 
Poland 1                   1   18 1    21 
Romania                    1    2    3 
Total 7 3 1 30 5 8 27 15 3 85 5 5 8 26 4 23  4 8 3 2 2 25 6 5 2  312 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics 
The table summarizes descriptive statistics for a sample of completed European bank M&As announced between 1998 and 2016. Both bidders and targets are located in EU-
27. The sample consists of 312 mergers between public bidders and public, private, or subsidiary targets. Both bidders and targets are commercial banks or credit institutions. 
Western Europe represents mergers where the target is a Western European bank. Eastern Europe represents mergers where the target is an Eastern European bank. Pre-crisis 
period is from 1998 to 2008 and crisis period is from 2009 to 2016. Panel A displays statistics for several bidder-specific variables. Panel B provides percentages of deal 
characteristics. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Significance for differences in means is based on the two-tail t-test assuming unequal variances. Significance for 
differences in proportion is based on the Chi-square test. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  Western Europe  Eastern Europe  Western  ̶ Eastern 
Panel A: Bidder characteristics  Pre-Crisis Crisis Difference  Pre-Crisis Crisis Difference  Pre-Crisis Crisis 
Ln(Size)  11.208 10.509 −0.699**   10.758 10.049 0.709  0.450 0.460 
Equity-to-assets  0.051 0.104 0.053***  0.063 0.095 0.031**  −0.012 0.010 
ROA   0.007 0.008 0.001  0.010 0.002 −0.008  −0.003 0.006 
Liquidity  1.709 1.366 −0.343***  1.412 1.201 −0.211*   0.297** 0.165 
Provisions   0.004 0.014 0.010***  0.006 0.014 0.008***   −0.002 0.000 
Panel B: Deal characteristics  Pre-Crisis Crisis Difference  Pre-Crisis Crisis Difference  Pre-Crisis Crisis 
HHI  0.049 0.081 0.032***  0.099 0.070 −0.029***  −0.050*** 0.011 
CR5  38.038 51.958 13.920***  58.573 49.323 −9.251***  −20.536*** 2.635 
Days to completion  114.042 84.911 −29.131**  93.057 150.360 57.303*  20.985 −65.449 
% Domestic  0.70 0.88 0.18***  0.30 0.79 0.49***  0.40*** 0.09 
% Public   0.24 0.19 −0.05  0.31 0.29 −0.02  −0.07 −0.10 
% Private  0.19 0.24 0.05   0.33 0.08 −0.25**  −0.14* 0.16* 
% Subsidiary  0.57 0.57 0.00  0.36 0.63 0.27**  0.21** −0.06 
% Cash  0.19 0.27 0.08  0.16 0.17 0.01  0.03 0.10 
% Stock  0.15 0.10 −0.05  0.00 0.13 0.13**  0.15** −0.03 
% Combo  0.29 0.38 0.09  0.42 0.41 −0.01  −0.13 −0.03 
% N/A method of  payment  0.37 0.26 −0.11*  0.42 0.29 −0.13  −0.05 −0.03 
% Western bidders  0.99 1.00 0.01  0.70 0.21 −0.49***  0.29*** 0.79*** 
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Table 4 
Bidder CARs around the announcement date 
This table illustrates the bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the merger announcement date for 
a sample of 312 completed European bank M&As announced between 1998 and 2016. Both bidders and targets 
are located in EU-27. The sample consists of 312 mergers between public bidders and public, private, or 
subsidiary targets. Both bidders and targets are commercial banks or credit institutions. Western Europe 
represents mergers where the target is a Western European bank. Eastern Europe represents mergers where the 
target is an Eastern European bank. Pre-crisis period is from 1998 to 2008 and crisis period is from 2009 to 
2016. Abnormal returns are estimated using the market model over 4 different event windows. The estimation 
period consists of 180 trading days and ends 21 trading days before the event date. The parametric test is the 
standardized cross-sectional test (StdCsect), and the non-parametric is the Corrado rank test (Rank test). Paired 
significance for the difference between mean CARs is based on the two-tail t-test assuming unequal variances. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  Whole period  Pre-crisis  Crisis  Difference 
Panel A: EU-27   n=312  n=198  n=114   
CAR (0)  −0.05%  −0.66%  1.00%  1.66%*** 
StdCsect  (−1.59)  (−3.39)***  (2.39)**  (t = 3.14) 
Rank test  (−1.00)  (−3.31)***  (2.48)**   
CAR (−1,+1)  −0.14%  −1.11%  1.54%  2.65%*** 
StdCsect  (−1.39)  (−3.53)***  (3.05)***  (t= 4.43) 
Rank test  (−0.42)  (−3.35)***  (3.39)***   
CAR (−2,+2)  −0.28%  −1.17%  1.27%  2.44%*** 
StdCsect  (−1.54)  (−3.37)***  (2.12)**  (t= 3.29) 
Rank test  (−0.52)  (−2.80)***  (2.58)**   
CAR (−5,+5)  −0.13%  −1.16%  1.65%  2.81%*** 
StdCsect  (−1.24)  (−3.00)***  (1.70)*  (t= 3.00) 
Rank test  (−0.57)  (−2.39)**  (1.97)**   
Panel B: Western Europe  n= 255  n= 165  n= 90   
CAR (0)  −0.13%  −0.79%  1.09%  1.88%*** 
StdCsect  (−1.81)*  (−3.46)***  (2.08)**  (t= 2.90) 
Rank test  (−1.46)  (−3.70)***  (2.39)**   
CAR (−1,+1)  −0.11%  −1.19%  1.86%  3.05%*** 
StdCsect  (−1.21)  (−3.32)***  (3.26)***  (t= 4.25) 
Rank test  (−0.16)  (−3.25)***  (3.87)***   
CAR (−2,+2)  −0.33%  −1.33%  1.49%  2.82%*** 
StdCsect  (−1.51)  (−3.33)***  (2.30)**  (t= 3.15) 
Rank test  −0.67  (−3.02)***  (2.77)***   
CAR (−5,+5)  −0.16%  −1.35%  2.02%  3.37%*** 
StdCsect  (−1.19)  (−3.02)***  (1.88)*  (t= 3.01) 
Rank test  (−0.68)  (2.53)**  (2.14)**   
Panel C: Eastern Europe  n= 57  n= 33  n= 24   
CAR (0)  0.29%  0.02%  0.66%  0.68% 
StdCsect  (1.15)  (0.15)  (1.26)  (t= 1.27) 
Rank test  (0.75)  (0.15)  (0.96)   
CAR (−1,+1)  −0.28%  −0.72%  0.32%  1.04% 
StdCsect  (−0.85)  (−1.42)  (0.14)  (t= 1.32) 
Rank test  (−0.86)  (−0.97)  (0.11)   
CAR (−2,+2)  −0.14%  −0.37%  0.43%  0.80% 
StdCsect  (−0.33)  (−0.61)  (0.14)  (t= 0.81) 
Rank test  (0.20)  (−0.12)  (0.44)   
CAR (−5,+5)  −0.03%  −0.24%  0.26%  0.50% 
StdCsect  (−0.04)  (−0.37)  (−0.15)  (t= 0.36) 
Rank test  (0.07)  (−0.16)  (0.30)   
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Table 5 
Regression analysis of bidder CARs for the whole sample 
This table summarizes regression results for a sample of completed European bank M&As announced between 
1998 and 2016. Both bidders and targets are located in EU-27. The sample consists of 312 mergers between 
public bidders and public, private, or subsidiary targets. Both bidders and targets are commercial banks or credit 
institutions. In each regression, the dependent variable is the bidder CARs around different event windows. 
Acquirer country fixed effects are included in the analysis. All independent variables are defined in the 
Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Significance is based on White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  CARs 
  CAR (0) CAR (−1,+1) CAR (−2,+2) CAR (−5,+5) 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Crisis  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.017** 0.016** 0.024** 0.022** 
  (3.11) (2.94) (3.17) (2.89) (2.31) (2.06) (2.16) (2.00) 
HHI  0.087**  0.085  0.015  0.005  
  (2.32)  (1.48)  (0.19)  (0.05)  
CR5   0.000***  0.000**  0.000  0.000 
   (2.86)  (2.39)  (1.40)  (0.47) 
Domestic  0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.018 0.020* 
  (0.51) (0.78) (0.58) (0.93) (0.62) (1.05) (1.46) (1.68) 
Cash  −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.004 
  (−0.27) (−0.33) (−0.17) (−0.23) (0.21) (0.09) (−0.33) (−0.40) 
Stock  0.002 −0.002 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.001 −0.002 −0.002 
  (0.22) (−0.21) (0.68) (0.31) (0.35) (0.11) (−0.10) (−0.12) 
Ln(Size)  −0.003** −0.003** −0.003 −0.003 0.000 0.000 −0.004 −0.005 
  (−2.24) (−2.26) (−1.61) (−1.57) (0.10) (0.03) (−1.23) (−1.41) 
Equity-to-assets  0.022 0.026 0.055 0.057 0.157** 0.156** 0.101 0.091 
  (0.42) (0.48) (0.95) (0.98) (2.16) (2.14) (0.89) (0.80) 
Private  0.002 −0.001 0.009 0.008 −0.008 −0.011 −0.002 −0.003 
  (0.32) (−0.15) (1.00) (0.93) (−0.79) (−1.13) (−0.15) (−0.20) 
Subsidiary  0.003 0.001 0.009 0.008 −0.002 −0.004 0.003 0.000 
  (0.46) (0.17) (1.08) (0.95) (−0.22) (−0.47) (0.22) (0.03) 
Days to Completion  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.34) (0.57) (0.80) (1.16) (−0.92) (−0.54) (0.60) (1.08) 
Constant  0.018 0.010 −0.012 −0.026 −0.024 −0.034 0.009 0.008 
  (0.82) (0.45) (−0.45) (−0.89) (−0.70) (−0.96) (0.20) (0.16) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  312 304 312 304 312 304 312 304 
Adjusted R
2
  0.093 0.120 0.079 0.092 0.042 0.050 0.024 0.027 
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Table 6 
Market concentration two-stage regressions 
This table reports results from two-stage regressions for sample of 312 c European bank M&As. In the first-stage regressions, the dependent variable is either HHI or CR5 
and Crisis is the instrumental variable. In the second-stage regressions, the dependent variable is the three-day bidder CARs. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Significance is based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  Western Europe  Eastern Europe 
Variables  HHI CAR CR5 CAR  HHI CAR CR5 CAR 
Crisis  0.020***  10.199***   −0.020**  −6.169**  
  (3.54)  (6.03)   (−2.44)  (−2.59)  
HHI   1.082***     −0.934   
   (3.26)     (−1.17)   
CR5     0.002***     −0.003 
     (3.31)     (−1.17) 
Domestic  −0.020* 0.030*** −8.284*** 0.026***  −0.007 −0.042 −1.558 −0.040 
  (−1.95) (3.38) (−2.81) (3.25)  (−0.33) (−1.10) (−0.26) (−1.08) 
Cash  0.012* −0.011 3.492* −0.006  0.008 −0.005 0.946 −0.009 
  (1.83) (−1.62) (1.75) (−0.99)  (0.96) (−0.39) (0.42) (−0.65) 
Stock  0.012** 0.001 4.218* −0.000  0.004 −0.005 0.634 −0.007 
  (2.05) (0.05) (1.92) (−0.01)  (0.56) (−0.25) (0.28) (−0.32) 
Ln(Size)  0.001 −0.004* 0.055 −0.003  −0.002 −0.007 −0.866 −0.008 
  (0.59) (−1.95) (0.12) (−1.54)  (−0.65) (−1.04) (−0.75) (−1.05) 
Equity-to-assets  0.025 0.030 2.745 0.052  −0.133* −0.107 −51.561** −0.138 
  (0.73) (0.47) (0.25) (0.84)  (−1.86) (−0.40) (−2.28) (−0.48) 
Private  0.007 0.005 1.749 0.006  0.004 0.004 0.178 0.001 
  (1.26) (0.41) (0.80) (0.60)  (0.54) (0.32) (0.07) (0.05) 
Subsidiary  0.013** 0.001 4.650*** 0.004  −0.007 −0.015 −1.462 −0.014 
  (2.52) (0.06) (2.61) (0.38)  (−1.02) (−0.68) (−0.68) (−0.63) 
Days to Completion  0.000 −0.000 −0.003 0.000  −0.000 0.000 −0.006 0.000 
  (0.60) (−0.01) (−0.27) (1.17)  (−1.01) (0.28) (−0.98) (0.20) 
Constant  0.022 −0.064* 35.336*** −0.116***  0.138*** 0.179 73.166*** 0.271 
  (0.85) (−1.66) (4.23) (−2.68)  (3.20) (0.99) (5.56) (1.05) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  255 255 247 247  57 57 57 57 
Adjusted R
2
  0.621 0.102 0.642 0.110  0.601 0.001 0.610 0.002 
Craig-Donald F-statistic  30.29  50.42   5.70  5.72  
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic  27.39  57.10   6.47  7.76  
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Table 7 
Changes in profitability 
This table summarizes merger-related differences in profitability for a sample of 312 completed European bank 
mergers announced between 1998 and 2016. Western Europe represents mergers where the target is a Western 
European bank. Eastern Europe represents mergers where the target is an Eastern European bank. Pre-crisis 
period is from 1998 to 2008 and crisis period is from 2009 to 2016. ΔROA denotes the difference between the 
post- and the pre-merger profitability of bidding bank. Pre-merger refers to the year-end prior to the merger 
completion year. Post-merger refers either to one or two years after the merger completion year. Significance for 
the differences is based on the t-test assuming unequal variances. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
Panel A: Western Europe 
  Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Difference 
Time period  ΔROA n  ΔROA n   
1 year after  −0.002*** 161  0.003 86  0.005* 
2 years after  −0.005** 157  0.003* 83  0.008** 
Panel B: Eastern Europe 
  Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Difference 
Time period  ΔROA n  ΔROA n   
1 year after  −0.004 32  0.006 23  0.010 
2 years after  −0.002 32  0.009 22  0.011 
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Table 8 
Market concentration and profitability  
This table reports results from two-stage regressions for sample of 312 European bank M&As. In the first-stage regressions, the dependent variable is either HHI or CR5 and 
Crisis is the instrumental variable. In the second-stage regressions, the dependent variable is the ΔROA between 2 years after the merger and one year before. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Significance is based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  Western Europe  Eastern Europe 
Variables  HHI ΔROA CR5 ΔROA  HHI ΔROA CR5 ΔROA 
Crisis  0.022***  10.774***   −0.021**  −6.582**  
  (3.78)  (6.18)   (−2.48)  (−2.64)  
HHI   0.290***     −2.120**   
   (2.76)     (−2.13)   
CR5     0.001***     −0.007** 
     (2.90)     (−2.13) 
Domestic  −0.020* 0.007*** −8.172*** 0.006***  −0.010 −0.073 −2.580 −0.070 
  (−1.91) (2.92) (−2.74) (2.88)  (−0.46) (−1.67) (−0.42) (−1.65) 
Cash  0.011* −0.001 3.030 −0.000  0.008 0.027*** 1.054 0.017* 
  (1.67) (−0.60) (1.55) (−0.09)  (1.01) (2.95) (0.47) (2.01) 
Stock  0.015** 0.002 5.129** 0.003  0.004 0.005 0.711 0.001 
  (2.17) (0.71) (2.06) (0.90)  (0.62) (0.40) (0.33) (0.09) 
Ln(Size)  0.001 −0.000 0.092 0.000  −0.002 −0.017 −0.630 −0.017 
  (0.67) (−0.42) (0.19) (0.04)  (−0.42) (−1.65) (−0.49) (−1.66) 
Equity-to-assets  0.021 −0.022 0.823 −0.015  −0.111 −0.370* −44.304* −0.435** 
  (0.60) (−0.41) (0.07) (−0.29)  (−1.37) (−1.97) (−1.72) (−2.05) 
Private  0.008 −0.004 2.346 −0.004  0.005 0.005 0.250 −0.002 
  (1.36) (−1.32) (1.02) (−1.28)  (0.56) (0.68) (0.10) (−0.26) 
Subsidiary  0.015*** −0.005 5.574*** −0.004  −0.006 −0.026* −1.342 −0.021* 
  (2.79) (−1.49) (3.14) (−1.39)  (−0.97) (−1.82) (−0.62) (−1.71) 
Days to Completion  0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000  −0.000 −0.000*** −0.007 −0.000*** 
  (0.83) (−0.40) (−0.04) (0.53)  (−1.10) (−3.09) (−1.06) (−3.08) 
Constant  0.024 −0.019* 36.245*** −0.033***  0.129** 0.445* 70.288*** 0.649* 
  (0.90) (−1.85) (4.16) (−2.62)  (2.68) (1.97) (4.76) (2.03) 
Country FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  241 241 233 233  54 54 54 54 
Adjusted R
2
  0.637 0.102 0.662 0.122  0.600 0.258 0.606 0.258 
Craig-Donald F-statistic  28.14  45.87   5.63  5.77  
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic  24.42  50.10   6.63  8.09  
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Table 9 
Profitability of bidders versus non-bidders 
This table illustrates changes in profitability based on propensity scores estimated from a probit model. In each 
model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an acquiring bank, and 0 
otherwise. Panel A presents the results of the probit model. Pre-crisis period is from 1998 to 2008 and crisis 
period is from 2009 to 2016. For each sub-period, we run two models: one when the outcome of interest is the 
ΔROA between 1 year after the merger completion year and one year before, and one other when the outcome of 
interest is the ΔROA between 2 years after the merger completion year and one year before. Panel B reports the 
difference in ΔROA between acquirers and PSM-matched non-acquirers (DiD estimate). We report PSM results 
using the closest-neighbor approach. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
Panel A: Probit model  Pre-crisis  Crisis 
Variables  1 year after 2 years after  1 year after 2 years after 
Size  0.324*** 0.322***  0.106*** 0.095** 
  (8.98) (8.75)  (2.85) (2.47) 
ROA  −0.276 −3.060  5.826 5.323 
  (−0.03) (−0.29)  (1.10) (0.93) 
Equity-to-assets  1.511 1.873  2.195 1.576 
  (0.86) (0.94)  (0.97) (0.65) 
Liquidity  −0.138*** −0.170***  −0.401*** −0.424*** 
  (−2.94) (−3.10)  (−2.84) (−2.86) 
Provisions  −37.723** −39.003**  6.769 4.528 
  (−2.46) (−2.43)  (1.14) (0.72) 
Periphery  0.589*** 0.596***  0.580*** 0.637*** 
  (5.36) (5.25)  (4.05) (4.33) 
Constant  −7.080*** −7.019***  −3.027*** −2.815*** 
  (−9.76) (−9.47)  (−3.82) (−3.46) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N  2,159 2,015  842 803 
Pseudo R
2
  0.190 0.197  0.104 0.110 
Panel B: ΔROA 
Acquirers  −0.001 −0.004  0.005 0.003 
Non-acquirers  −0.001 −0.001  −0.005 −0.006 
DiD  0.000 −0.003*  0.010** 0.009** 
 
 
 
